QSA 6 Bars / KSA To P Bty RHA , Twice MID

QSA 6 clasps, Cape Colony, Paardeberg, Driefontein, Johannesburg, Diamond Hill, Wittebergen (81658 DVR: G. Parmenter. P. Bty: R.H.A.); King’s South Africa 1901-02, 2 clasps, SA01, SA02 (81658 DVR: G. PARMENTER. R.H.A.)

George Parmenter was born in Exeter, Devon, in 1870 and attested for the Royal Horse Artillery at Bristol on 19 November 1890. He served in India from 29 September 1891 to 29 November 1898, before transferring to the Reserve on 1 December 1898. Recalled for War service on 9 October 1899, he served with ‘P’ Battery in South Africa during the Boer War from 3 November 1899 to 6 September 1902, and was twice Mentioned in Despatches (London Gazettes 7 May 1901 and 10 September 1901). One of five men who "rendered excellent service in trying to withdraw a gun from camp under very heavy fire". Gen Clement's despatch on Nooitgedacht 13-12-1900 He was discharged on 18 November 1902, after 12 years’ service.

NOOITGEDACHT Dec 13th 1900










A force of about 1500 men, nine guns and more than 100 wagons under the command of General R.A.P. Clements had been plundering the Magaliesberg valley since October 1900. On 8 December Clements was warned of a large Boer presence in the area and, while he waited for reinforcements from Krugersdorp the column camped on the farm Nooitgedacht at the foot of the highest cliffs in the range. A steep gulley gave access to the top of the mountain where Clements posted a signalling corps and picket guards of about 150 men on either side of the gulley



From hidden observation posts De la Rey and Smuts watched the establishment of the camp. The isolated pickets on the cliffs could easily be overcome leaving the camp completely vulnerable. General Christiaan Beyers, De la Rey’s counterpart in the northern Transvaal, was approaching Bethanie with another 1500 men. The addition of these gave the Boers a strength twice that of Clements’s column and with this advantage they could be confident of victory.

Between the two Boer detachments, however, Broadwood’s cavalry was encamped near Kromrivier and his intelligence had informed him of Beyers’s presence in the area. Beyers solved the problem by letting it be known among the local people that he was intending to attack Rustenburg; within twelve hours the disinformation had reached Broadwood and he led his column westwards to protect the town. However, he neglected to pass on to Clements his knowledge of the new Boer arrivals and so contributed to the eventual British disaster.



Battle of Nooitgedacht - Soon after dawn the pickets posted on the summit were overpowered by the Boer commandos





Beyers and De la Rey met on 12 December and the combined attack was put in motion. Operating from a base on the Breedtsnek road, two of Beyers’s commandos under Commandants Van Staden and Krause climbed up the northern slope to capture the pickets on the western buttress of the Nooitgedacht cliffs. Another pair of commandos, under Commandants Kemp and Marais, took the eastern buttress while a fifth, under Commandant Badenhorst, moved along the southern base of the cliffs and attacked a mounted infantry camp posted outside Clements’s main camp. The rest of Beyers’s force remained at their base in anticipation of the possible return of Broadwood from Rustenburg.

De la Rey in the meantime led his men against the main British camp in the Moot while Smuts moved to the south-east to cut off Clements’s line of retreat. The attack started before dawn. At the base of the cliff Badenhorst’s commando was repulsed by the mounted infantry outpost on what is now African Hills Safari Lodge. In a fierce battle the British commander of the outpost, Colonel N. Legge, was killed. On top of the mountain Beyers’s men were wavering in the face of volleys of fire from the entrenched pickets. However, in Deneys Reitz’s account of the battle, “the troops facing us on the mountain now made a mistake ...when they saw Badenhorst’s men retire in confusion they set up loud shouts of triumph. Stung by their cries our whole force, on some sudden impulse started to our feet and went pouring forward, shouting and yelling, men dropping freely as we went. Almost before we knew it we were swarming over the walls shooting and clubbing in hand to hand conflict.”





By 7:00 the Boers were in control of the summit and fired relentlessly into the camp below. British soldiers scattered in disarray. Clements ordered a detachment of Cameron Highlanders to climb the narrow path up to re-take the summit, but they were mercilessly shot down. Sergeant Donald Farmer won a Victoria Cross for carrying a wounded officer to safety on that treacherous path.

Uncharacteristically, De la Rey withheld his attack on the main camp for some time, explaining later that he had awaited confirmation of Beyers’s success before attacking. The delay allowed Clements to regain control of his panicking men and organise a disciplined retreat.





While the Boers were looting and celebrating their victory, Clements was able to conduct an orderly retreat and to direct artillery fire back into the camp he had vacated.



Smuts, too, was tardy in closing off the British retreat so that Clements, having been unwise in his choice of campsite, now demonstrated very competent leadership. Despite the initial chaos of the surprise attack, he calmly led his stricken column to a small hill called Vaalkop (Yeomanry Hill to the British) to the south-east. Here he was able to stage a rearguard action that prevented Smuts from inflicting any damage.

The RHA's P Battery played a crucial role in retrieving their guns after the battle and supporting General French's operations in the area.

Code: 51146